What is an Academic Judgement?

This paper considers the nature of academic judgement. It also suggests that academic judgement is not the special preserve of academics as such and is something with which students can be imbued. It is further suggested that academic judgement is best considered in the context of critical learning which is contrasted with demonstrative learning. The paper then proceeds with an analysis of judgement by considering the ideas of Peter Geach on this particular subject. It then moves to considering judgement in the context of a practice, as set out by Alasdair MacIntyre. Whilst providing insight into the nature of practical judgement, this approach is found wanting nonetheless and attention is next turned to considering judgement within the space of reasons – that is, the approach of John McDowell. The paper then suggests that the idea of the space of reasons can be given greater substance through consideration of two further kinds of judgement – epistemic and reflective

Employer concepts of graduate employability

This is an ESCalate research project led by Geoff Hinchliffe of the University of East Anglia. The project aims to research employer perceptions of graduate employability. The HE understanding of employer perception is currently framed in terms of key skills and personal qualities which are then reflected back into degree programmes. There has been insufficient recent systematic research undertaken into employer expectations of graduates (for example, to what extent do employers operate with a concept o

Education, Learning and Freedom

This paper takes as its starting point Kant’s analysis of freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason. From this analysis, two different types of freedom are discerned, formative and instrumental freedom. The paper suggests that much of what passes for the pedagogy of learning in UK universities takes the form of an instrumental freedom. This, however, involves the neglect of formative freedom – the power to put learning to question. An emancipatory concept of education requires that formative freedom lies at the heart of the educative endeavour, to which learning must be seen as secondary. The proposal of the two types of freedom is based on a relatively detailed consideration Kant’s Critique – this is necessary in order to ensure that the concepts of instrumental and formative freedom have a credible philosophical basis

Sartre’s analysis of anti-Semitism and its relevance for today

In the second half of 1944, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote an essay entitled ‘Anti-Semite and Jew’. He analyses what might be termed the moral pathology of the anti-Semite. Such a person, Sartre suggests, has chosen to enact a passion, a passion of hatred. The motive is the desire for ‘impenetrability’ – a disavowal of reasoned argument – and a pleasure taken in the assertion and re-assertion of what is known to be false. Sartre’s essay was written hurriedly and looking back over 70 years, we can see its flaws. But I suggest that the kernel of his analysis of the anti-Semite is compelling, especially in the context of the growth of anti-immigrant prejudice in the UK and elsewhere. Using Sartre as a starting point, I discuss the nature of prejudice and suggest that to counter prejudices, a civic education is needed that emphasises a narrative of liberty

Liberty and Education:A Civic Republican Approach

This book takes the thinking of Quentin Skinner, Phillip Pettit and J.G.A. Pocock on republican liberty and explores the way in which this can be used to illuminate educational practice. It argues that republican liberty is distinct from both negative and positive liberty and its emphasis on liberty as non-domination gives the concept of liberty a particularly critical role in contemporary society. The book formulates and expounds the idea that an empire of liberty requires the existence of what are termed ‘liberty-bearing agents’ and shows how education – with a particular emphasis on knowledge - is needed to foster the human powers so that persons can become liberty-bearing

John Dewey and Antonio Gramsci: thinkers for our times

The lives of John Dewey (1859-1952) and Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) could not be of greater contrast in their personal circumstances; the one led a long, active, healthy and free life, whilst the other struggled in difficult social and political circumstances, suffered from ill-health and spent the last 10 years of his life in prison where he nevertheless succeeded in writing on history and philosophy. What makes a comparison fruitful is that both identified the central role that education plays in building a democratic way of life. Their very different experiences, both personal and political form the basis for more than merely a textual comparison: for we can read Gramsci’s Selections from Prison Notebooks against Democracy and Education and vice-versa. Arguably, a comprehensive account of the role of education in democratic life needs to take account ideas from both texts – not as forming a convenient unity but rather as a tension that informs our reflective practice

Reading Adorno:Creating a Free Public

In this paper I explore the theme of domination. But rather than taking the theme of domination associated with republican liberty I investigate the idea of domination elaborated by Adorno. In particular, I am interested in how domination can be resisted through the creation of a ‘free public’. This is a public space not so much colonised by instrumental reason but a space which permits and enables free activity. I use Kant’s concept of freedom as set out in the Critique of Pure Reason to show how freedom is potentially a creative, enabling force. And I explore an example of an unseen public which nevertheless exhibits many of the characteristics of a free public. Such publics may be fleeting and transient but they nevertheless constitute the possibility of hope in the face of Adornian pessimism

On the idea of intrinsic human worth

This paper argues that the idea of intrinsic worth encompasses all human beings, no matter how they are circumstanced. This concept needs to be understood transcendentally, not prescriptively. These terms are explained, with particular reference to Kant. It also argues that discourses of identity and recognition can best be understood through the idea of human worth. The paper suggests that human worth cannot be explicitly defined but needs to be expressed indirectly through signs and gestures. One way of doing this is through the invocation of sympathy and to this end a version of Hume’s account of sympathy is presented. The paper concludes with some remarks as to how ‘human intrinsic worth’ might be incorporated into pedagogy